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NOTES AND COMMENTS
acted in like manner and dispose of the controversy accordingly
-without undertaking to determine whether the party in the case
at hand is more or less benighted than his predecessor. The advantage of such a policy would not be limited to making easier
the work of courts. Its adoption would impart a degree of certainty
to the body of precedents in such cases, which would enhance
their value as a guide to attorneys and litigants.
But it was that inflexibility of legal standards, so convenient
to courts of law, which gave rise to equity jurisdiction in the first
place. Whatever the certainty of precedent and the rigidity of
abstract principles, cases will arise in which peculiar circumstances will seem to call for relief from the operation of those
rules and principles. In the words of Justice Smedley, "If this
' The questioncannot be done, what is a court of equity for?" 42
and regrettably it remains a question at the end as it was at the
beginning of this discussion-is whether or not the inexperience,
lack of education, or substandard intellectual capacity of a litigant
may ever be numbered among those peculiar circumstances.
Robert R. Sanford.

PASSAGE OF EQUITABLE TITLE IN TEXAS UNDER AN
EXECUTORY CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF LAND

B Y the general rule in the United States a purchaser acquires
equitable title to land immediately on entering into a valid
executory land contract.' Certain consequences respecting his rights
flow from the application of such a rule; for example, it is generally held that the purchaser bears the risk of loss from destruction
, 226
Tex.42 Dissenting in Alexander v. Hagedorn, (1950).
1 Junkin v. McClain, 221 Iowa 1084, 265 N. W. 362 (1936);
302 Mich. 282. 4 N. W. 2d 596 (1942) ; Petition of S. R. A., Inc.,
N. W. 2d 442 (1945). af'd, 327 U. S. 558 (1946) ; Savings Trust
Skain, 345 Mo. 46, 131 S.W. 2d 566 (1939).

S. W. 2d 996, 1003
Barker v. Klinger,
219 Minn. 493, 18
Co. of St. Louis v.
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of the property or decrease in its value and benefits from any increase in value.' However, the wording of several Texas cases and
the actual holdings of a few have been said to cast a doubt upon
the existence of such a rule so far as this jurisdiction is concerned.
In Johnson v. Wood,' decided in 1941, the Texas Commission
of Appeals, in an opinion adopted by the Texas Supreme Court,
held that where the full purchase price had been paid, the equitable title passed to the vendee and Article 55314 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948) which bars the bringing of
an action for specific performance of a land contract after the lapse
of four years, was not applicable. The court stated that the vendee
should prevail since his suit was for the recovery of land and,
therefore, fell within the orbit of Article 5529' of the Revised
Statutes, which expressly omits provision for a limitation period
for the recovery of real estate. While the holding was not inconsistent with the general rule, certain language in the opinion did cast
doubt upon its application in Texas. The court expressed itself in
the following language:6
"So long as Johnson had not performed his covenants by the payment of the purchase price, he had but an equitable right, but upon
his performance that right ripened into an equitable title superior to
that of Wood. An equitable title, as distinguished from a mere equitable right, will support an action of trespass to try title."

As a consequence the decision has been interpreted to mean that
in Texas a mere equitable right will not support an action for specific performance and further that the rights and liabilities of the
vendee under an executory land contract are entirely different
3 Davidson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 71 Iowa 532, 32 N. W. 514 (1887) ; McGinley v.
Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921).
3 138 Tex. 106, 157 S. W. 2d 146, rev'g 137 S. W. 2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
4 The statute declares: "Any action for performance of a contract for the conveyance of real estate shall be commenced within four years next after the cause of action
shall have accrued, and not thereafter."
5 "Every action other than for the recovery of real estate, for which no limitation
is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within four years next after the right to bring
the same shall have accrued and not afterward."
e 138 Tex. at 110, 157 S. W. 2d at 148. Emphasis added. This language appears
verbatim in Pickle v. Whitaker, 224 S. W. 2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

from those existing in other jurisdictions. It is submitted, however, that the distinction between an equitable right and an equitable title is merely one of terminology and that except for the
situations involving the action of trespass to try title and the resulting application of Article 5529, the substantive effect of the rule
in Texas is no different from the rule followed elsewhere.
Although the court in Johnson v. Wood, and in subsequent cases
containing language preserving the distinction between equitable
title and equitable right, did not discuss the matter, there are
early Texas Supreme Court cases which might be advanced as authority for such a distinction between equitable right and equitable
title. Early in Texas statehood, in Browning v. Estes,7 decided in
1848, the court held that a purchaser of land under a land contract could not resist his vendor's action for possession while the
purchase price remained unpaid. In 1849, in Hemming v. Zimmerschitte, the court in considering an action for specific performance of a land contract held that where a purchaser had fully performed by paying the purchase price, "He was from that time
fully clothed with equitable title and had a perfect right at any
time to have demanded the conveyance of the interest remaining in
the vendor." 9 Following these two decisions, the supreme court in
Neil v. Keese,'0 in 1849, held a defendant's equitable title to be a
valid defense to a suit in trespass to try title. Two years later, in
1851, the same court held that equitable title was sufficient title to
enable the plaintiff to prevail in an action of trespass to try title."
In order for the four decisions noted to be reconciled, the distinguishing factor would seem to lie in the payment or non-payment
of the purchase price since, as indicated above, equitable title is
both a good defense to and a sufficient basis for maintaining a suit
in trespass to try title. Further, it appears that unless the purchase
price has been paid, the vendee will lose in a suit of this nature
73

Tex. 462.

8 4 Tex. 159.

9 Id. at 166.
10 5 Tex. 23.
11 Easterling v. Blythe. 7 Tex. 210.
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and that where the full purchase has been paid the vendee becomes the owner of the equitable title from the time of such payment.
While it is possible that the court actually intended through these
decisions to hold that payment of the purchase price is a necessary prerequisite to the passage of equitable title for all purposes,
no reasons or authority were cited by the court. It might be urged
that the law of Spain influenced the court; the Spanish rule is expressed as follows in Las Siete Partidas:12
"The ownership of property which is sold does not pass to the party
who is given possession of the same until he has paid for it.
"Men obtain possession of the property of others through sales or
gifts by way of dowry, or in other ways, or by exchange, or for some
other lawful reason; wherefore we decree that the ownership of property passes to the party who obtains possession of it by grants of this
kind by one man to another or by his order. If, however, the party who
sold his property to another gives him possession of it, and the purchaser has not paid the price, or given a surety or pledges or appointed
a time for payment, the mere giving of possession in this way does not
transfer the ownership of the property until the purchase price has been
paid. But if the party has given a surety or pledges, or appointed a time
for payment, or where the vendor trusts the purchaser for the price,
then the ownership of said property shall vest in him by the mere act
of giving possession, and even though the price has not been paid, he is,
nevertheless, hound to pay it." ' (Emphasis added.)
However, there are Texas cases containing language expressly

stating that equitable title vests eo instanti the binding land conLAS SIFTE PARTIDAS (Scott's English Translation, 1931) Part. 3, L. XLVI.
It is noteworthy, in a consideration of the Spanish rule, that equity as known to
the jurisdictions of the common law is not a part of the legal system of Louisiana,
whose jurisprudence is founded upon the civil law. See Howe, Roman and Civil Law
in America, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 342 (1903).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that no title passes to the vendee on
signing of a contract for the sale of land, Peck v. Bemiss, 10 La. Ann. 160 (1885), and
that the risks of ownership remain on the vendor, McDonald v. Aubert, 17 La. 448
(1841).
Payment of the purchase price in Louisiana gives right to claim delivery of the
res, which is analogous to the Texas right of specific performance, but does not transfer any title or risks of ownership. Page v. Loeffer, 146 La. 890, 84 So. 194 (1920).
12

13

1951.]
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tract is entered into, 4 thereby refuting any implication that the
Spanish law controls. In addition, there are Texas holdings to the
effect that the vendee has the right to the increments of the land 5
and that he must pay taxes1" and paving liens.' These consequences
are entirely consistent with the general rule. Moreover, a comparison of the specific performance cases in Texas with those in other
jurisdictions particularly serves to illustrate that the vendee's equitable interest is the same. Where the full purchase price has been
paid in other jurisdictions, the vendee has equitable title as he
does in Texas. s The only difference in that situation is that in
other states the remedy of the vendee is specific performance because of the requirement of legal title as a prerequisite to bringing
the action of ejectment, while in Texas the vendee can bring trespass to try title. In both instances the vendee is entitled to the land.
In the situation where the vendee has tendered the purchase price
but the vendor has refused it, other jurisdictions allow specific
peformance and Texas is in accord.' 9 The only distinction lies in
the effect of the statutes of limitation, which vary according to the
jurisdiction being considered.
In the situation where the vendee has not tendered the purchase
price, although equitable title is said to pass in other states, specific
performance will be denied unless there is a tender 0 or compliance
14 Leeson v. City of Houston, 243 S. W. 485 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922),
opinion
adopted by the Supreme Court; Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 157 S. W. 2d 149 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941) er. ref.; Alworth v. Ellison, 27 S. W. 2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)
er. ref.
15 Rives v. James, 3 S. W. 2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) er. ref.
16 Ingraham v. Central Bitulithic Co., 51 S. W. 2d 1067 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) er.
ref.; Alworth v. Ellison, 27 S. W. 2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) er. ref.
17 Ingraham v. Central Bitulithic Co., 51 S. W. 2d 1067 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) er.
ref.
18 Since the vendee in other jurisdictions has equitable title prior to payment of the
purchase price, he has it a fortiori after payment of the purchase price.
19 Babcock v. Lewis, 113 S. W. 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) er. ref.; Roberts v.
Mayer, 191 Ga. 588, 13 S. E. 2d 382 (1941) ; Daven v. Downey, 378 Ill. 543, 39 N. E.
2d 45 (1944) ; Utterback v. Stewart, 224 Iowa 1135, 277 N. W. 735 (1938).
20 McPherson v. Johnson, 69 Tex. 484. 6 S. W. 798 (1888) ; Haldeman v. Chambers,
19 Tex. 1 (1857) ; Jones v. Akins, 281 S. W. 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) er. dism'd; Ross
v. Blunt, 166 S. W. 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) er. ref.; Carpenter v. Shannon Bros.,
199 Ark. 449, 134 S. W. 2d 6 (1940) ; Boro v. Beaulieu, 20 Cal. 2d 849, 122 P. 2d 517,
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with the requirements stated by Justice Cardozo in Epstein v.
Gluckin:2 ' "What equity exacts as a condition of relief is the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate without injustice
or oppression either to the plaintiff or to the defendant." The result
in Texas appears to be substantially the same, for no Texas case
has been found which will permit specific performance of a land
contract solely on the basis of the equitable right of the vendee
unless the defendant vendor is fully protected by the payment of
the purchase price. On the contrary, several Texas decisions require the vendee to tender the balance of the purchase price into
court 2 or make the decree of specific performance conditional
upon payment of the purchase price,2" thus complying with the
requirement of Epstein v. Glckin.
While there is a possibility, in view of the earlier Texas decisions, supra, that the passage of equitable title depends on whether
or not the purchase money has been paid, it is more probable that
the decisions in Johnson v. Wood and in other cases containing
similar language are merely a rationalization adopted in order to
avoid the effect of the statute of limitations. Under the rationalization the courts permit a vendee to bring an action for legal title
after the same would have been barred by a strict interpretation
of the statute of limitations as it applies to specific performance
of a contract for the conveyance of land under Article 5531. Apparently it has been reasoned that if the vendee can be brought
within the operation of the express omission in Article 5529, then
the party actually entitled to the property will prevail. The statute
of limitations was set up as a defense in all of the cases in which
the language of Johnson v. Wood appears.24
129 P. 2d 345 (1943) ; White v. Cohn, 137 Fla. 501, 188 So. 581 (1939)); Gilleland v.
Welch, 199 Ga. 341. 34 S. E. 2d 517 (1945).
21 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861, 862 (1922).
22 Polk v. Kyser, 53 S. W. 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) ; Hunter v. Clayton, 36 S. W.
326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).

23
24

Kalklosh v. Haney, 23 S. W. 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
Secrest v. Jones, 21 Tex. 121 (1858) ; Ft. Quitman Land Co. v. Mier, 211 S. W.

2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); MacDonald v. Follet, 180 S. W. 2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944).

